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Philosophical Approaches to
Qualitative Research

Renée Spencer, Julia M. Pryce, and Jill Walsh

Abstract
This chapter reviews some of the major overarching philosophical approaches to qualitative inquiry
and includes some historical background for each. Taking a “big picture” view, the chapter discusses
post-positivism, constructivism, critical theory, feminism, and queer theory and offers a brief history of
these approaches; considers the ontological, epistemological, and axiological assumptions on which they
rest; and details some of their distinguishing features. In the last section, attention is turned to the future,
identifying three overarching, interrelated, and contested issues with which the field is being confronted
and will be compelled to address as it moves forward: retaining the rich diversity that has defined the
field, the articulation of recognizable standards for qualitative research, and the commensurability of
differing approaches.
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Much ink has been spilled in what have been
called the “paradigm wars,” or battles within psychology and related disciples about how we know—
and who judges—what is real. Efforts to establish
the legitimacy of qualitative research have often
taken the form of vociferous arguments for the
merits of qualitative approaches, typically cast in
terms of the contrasts between these and the more
widely accepted quantitative approaches to knowledge production. More recently, even as the push
toward evidence-based practice gains momentum
and predictably lists the field toward greater uniformity in acceptable approaches to establishing
what can be deemed credible evidence, qualitative
approaches have continued to strengthen in presence and broaden in reach. Once a seeming fledging
movement, despite its long but sometimes forgotten
history (Wertz et al., 2011), qualitative research in
psychology appears to have come of age. This maturity is reflected in the wide variety of philosophical

approaches to qualitative research that have now
firmly taken root.
In this chapter, we review some of the major
overarching philosophical approaches to qualitative
inquiry and include some historical background for
each. Here, we offer a “big picture” view and leave
it to other chapters in this section (on interpretive,
critical, feminist, and indigenous approaches) to
take a more fine-grained look at some of the particular fields of thought within these. Described by
Denzin and Lincoln (2013) as “a field of inquiry in
its own right” (p. 5), qualitative research cuts across
disciplines and is represented in many areas of scholarship. We focus here on psychology, but recognize
the substantial work done in related fields such as
sociology, anthropology, social work, social policy,
humanities, and the health sciences, in particular
nursing. We cannot possibly do justice to the work
that has been done in this arena in this one chapter.
Entire volumes (c.f., Denzin & Lincoln, 2013) are
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devoted to introducing researchers to these issues.
We offer here what we hope is a concise and practical overview of some of the major philosophical
assumptions that undergird qualitative research and
shape its implementation today.
Once dominated by quantitative methods
anchored in positivistic and post-positivistic research
paradigms, a greater balance in the use of methodological and philosophical approaches is now
being utilized in psychological research (Ponterotto,
2005; Rennie, Watson, & Monteiro, 2002). The
importance of qualitative research has long been
justified by many on the basis of Dilthey’s argument
that the distinctive natures of natural science and
human science called for different approaches: “We
explain nature, but we understand psychic life”
(1894/1977, p. 27; as cited in Wertz et al., p. 80).
Today, qualitative methods are viewed as being
particularly well-suited to addressing some of our
most pressing issues and concerns, such as the influence of culture on psychological development and
its role in psychological interventions (Ponterotto,
Casas, Suzuki, & Alexander, 2010). The rise of participatory action research (PAR), with its emphasis
on social change and the empowerment of community participants (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005),
has also required employing a range of qualitative
approaches (i.e., focus groups, interviews, participant observation, photo-voice, and storytelling) to
collecting data that contribute to the development
of the kind of deeper understandings of the experiences of the participants needed to effect meaningful change.
The diversity of qualitative approaches can be
dizzying and makes agreement about their appropriate use, in what forms, and according to what
standards difficult, if not impossible. It can be
challenging for “insiders” to navigate these issues,
let alone the novice researcher wading into this terrain. Seemingly simple questions about sample size
and composition or the specific steps one should
take in data analysis and how to achieve reliable
findings can provoke lengthy discussion and even
heated debates, with researchers take opposing positions and rooting their justification for these in
foundational principles of qualitative research. Even
more maddening for some, such questions may simply yield a repeated singular and highly unsatisfying
response of “it depends.”
This seeming confusion can stem in part from
differences in the purpose or aims of the research
and in beliefs associated with core philosophies of
science embedded within the varying approaches,
82

namely ontology, epistemology, and axiology
(Creswell, 2007; Hays & Singh, 2012; Ponterotto,
2005). At its core, psychological research may be
carried out with markedly distinct purposes, such
as explaining and predicting aspects of the human
experience, increasing our understanding of the
lived experiences of different groups of people, or
critiquing and changing the current conditions
within which we live and strive to grow (Lincoln,
Lynham, & Guba, 2013). These different aims may
also be carried out using approaches to research
that rest on differing foundational assumptions
about the nature of our world (ontology) and our
knowledge about it (epistemology), as well as the
role of values in the process of knowledge production (axiology), that are conceptualized by Hays and
Singh (2012) as falling along separate continuums
of beliefs.
Ontology is the study of the nature of reality.
Within the context of qualitative research, ontology
is discussed in terms of beliefs about the existence
of some “universal truth” and about objectivity.
At one end of the spectrum is a belief that reality is objective and that there are universal truths
about reality that can be known. At the other end
is a belief that reality is subjective and contextual,
and a universal understanding of psychological
experiences cannot be obtained because they must
always be understood within the contexts within
which they are embedded (Hays & Singh, 2012).
The crux of these viewpoints is also represented in
the terms “emic” and “etic,” which are often used
in anthropology and cultural psychology. These
terms have been used to capture the distinction
between experience-near understandings of culture
and human experience, or what an insider within
a local context would recognize and resonate with,
and more experience-distant conceptualizations or
abstractions about cultural processes (e.g., Geertz,
1983). Etic can also be thought of as generalizations about human behavior that are universally
true and emic as those that are contextually situated and not generalizable, such as local customs
(Ponterotto, 2005).
Epistemology is the study of the process of
knowing or “how we know what we know” (Guba
& Lincoln, 2008; Ponterotto, 2005). It is concerned with how we gain knowledge of what exists
and the relationship between the knower—in this
case the researcher—and the world. The researcher
and research participant may be considered independent of one another. In this view, researchers
can use rigorous, systematic approaches to studying
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participants objectively or without researcher bias.
This results in much attention being paid to rigor
in research, particularly in the form of strict adherence to generally accepted systematic approaches to
enhancing objectivity and reducing researcher bias.
On the other side of the continuum is an understanding of knowledge as being actively constructed
by the researcher and participant, who exert mutual
influence on one another. Rather than removing
or guarding against researcher bias, the dynamic
interaction between the researcher and participant
is viewed as central to capturing the inherently contextualized experiences of the participant. Issues of
rigor remain but take on different meanings and
forms. The goal here is not to eliminate bias—
because that would be futile—but rather to enhance
the trustworthiness of the findings by including and
documenting multiple perspectives on the focus of
the inquiry. In some cases, this might mean demonstrating that the researcher became immersed
enough in the participants’ experiences so as to
credibly represent and interpret them. In others,
this might involve triangulating the data sources
and/or the investigators.
Axiology is concerned with how values and
assumptions of the researcher influence the scientific process, as well as what actions the researcher
takes with the research produced (Lincoln et al.,
2013). What place do the emotions, expectations,
and values of the researcher have in the research
process? Should systematic steps be taken to ensure
that the process is kept free of these so that they do
not influence the participants and the results? Or is
such a pursuit futile and the best a researcher can
do is identify, describe, or even attempt to “bracket”
(Wertz, 2011) his or her values? Much qualitative
research today rests on the assumption that research
is “radically relational” and is inevitably shaped,
and even intentionally informed, by the researcher’s
orientation, values, and personal qualities (Wertz
et al., 2011, p. 84). In research that seeks to change
the status quo with regard to the unequal distribution of power and resources, such as in PAR, the
researcher’s experience is central to the process and
may be key to achieving the intended outcomes of
the research (Ponterotto, 2005). With regard to
action, the positions range from researcher as distant observer of the study participants to researcher
as change agent who is deliberately striving to
achieve social justice through the work produced.
In some cases, the assumptions of a researcher
may align more neatly along one side of these continuums. For example, a feminist researcher may hold

that there are multiple truths and that knowledge is
constructed in relationship with study participants,
with the values and assumptions of the researcher
integral to the construction of this knowledge. In
others, the assumptions may be more mixed, such
as a researcher who endorses a constructivist view of
reality but views researcher reflexivity as less central
to the research process. When these differing ontological, epistemological, and axiological stances go
unacknowledged, the differences among qualitative
approaches can seem as vast as those between quantitative and qualitative methods. As Camic, Rhodes,
and Yardley (2003), among many, have argued, the
principle that should unify us is the need for coherence between the nature of our questions and the
methodological and philosophical approach taken
to answering them.
In the next sections, we review the following major overarching philosophical approaches
that guide and structure qualitative research:
post-positivism, constructivism, critical theory,
feminism, and queer theory. We offer a brief history
of each of the approaches; consider the ontological, epistemological, and axiological assumptions on
which they rest; and detail some of the distinguishing features while also attempting to capture some
of the diversity within them. We also touch on some
prominent applications of these approaches to qualitative research in psychology. We recognize that
these approaches have been grouped and defined
in varying ways and that they defy this sort of tidy
categorization. Still, we draw some lines here in an
effort to highlight distinctive ideas within each.
Also included are discussions of applications of each
of the approaches.

Philosophical Approaches
Post-Positivism

Post-positivism grew out of the positivist view of
science, and together these have dominated research
in psychology for much of the field’s history (Packer,
2011). Positivism rests on the ontological assumption that some objective truth or reality exists that
is independent of our beliefs and constructions
and can be ascertained through direct observation
and experience. The efforts of science, thus, are put
toward establishing universal laws of nature and,
within psychology, universal laws of human development and experience. The attainment of this
knowledge and our confidence in it depends on following systematic procedures through which claims
about truth can be verified. Hypothesis generation
and testing using valid measures of operationally
Spencer, Pryce, Walsh
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defined variables are primary tools, and the goal is
to be able, with confidence, to generalize the knowledge obtained to some larger general population.
Post-positivism introduces the idea that hypotheses
can never actually be proven beyond any doubt and
that theory should tested in order to be falsified
as well as verified. Issues of validity and reliability
are of central importance in research within this
paradigm, as are considerations of credible alternative hypotheses to explain the phenomenon being
studied.

Copyright © 2014. Oxford University Press, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

History

Post-positivism is rooted in logical positivism,
a term coined by a group of scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers in the early 1900s known
as the Vienna Circle. Building on the “positive philosophy” of Auguste Comte, but also emphasizing
the importance of formal logic in scientific investigation, these thinkers determined that science
required a systematic way of organizing our direct
observations of experience and sought to inductively build laws of the natural world based on the
construction of meaningful and unambiguous logical statements (Packer, 2011). Only statements of
fact that could be verified in some way or tested
empirically were considered to be meaningful in the
scientific endeavor.
Karl Popper (1934/1959) objected to the idea
that this kind of inductive construction and confirmation of factual, logical statements that were
purportedly free from personal and theoretical bias
could lead to certainty about the natural world.
Instead, he argued that the laws of science had to be
built through a process of falsification or testing of
hypotheses. He argued that data disproving hypotheses are more definitive than those supporting them,
as in any given study there is always the risk that
the data gathered do not accurately or fully represent the real world being studied. The disconfirming
case or cases may simply have not made it into the
sample drawn for study.

Foundational Assumptions

Post-positivism retains the belief in an observable external reality and the existence of universal
truths but contends that a fully accurate representation of them can never be achieved with certitude
(Popper, 1934/1959). Although things exist beyond
our experience of them, it is recognized that our
knowledge of this world is socially constructed. Bias
is unavoidable. All observations are fallible because
they are inherently laden with our individual and
84

cultural biases. Although we can never get to the
truth with any certainty, post-positivists contend
that we should continually strive to come as close as
we possibly can. Because all measurement is biased
and introduces error, issues of reliability and validity are paramount. Great attention is paid to reducing or controlling for bias through the design of the
research and the use of clearly defined techniques
such as controls groups and multiple forms of measurement or triangulation. This attempt to remove
or at least reduce bias extends to the subjectivity
of the researcher as well as to the intentions of the
research. The researcher is to remain as neutral as
possible throughout the research process and should
not engage in research in the service of advocacy for
any particular position within their field.
From a post-positivist perspective, the existence
of multiple worldviews does not extend into a belief
in complete relativism and an incommensurability of perspectives—the belief that our differences
in experiences and culture mean that we can never
understand each other. Whereas we may never
achieve objectivity in the true sense of the word, we
can employ systematic ways of checking our biases
both individually and collectively through engaging
in the scientific enterprise within a community of
people who critically review one another’s work.

Implications for Research Methods

Research rooted in post-positivism aims to
explain psychological phenomenon by identifying factors that predict particular outcomes and
the relationships between them. A priori theory
about how things are related is used to guide the
research, which then seeks to verify or falsify these
theory-based ideas. Having confidence in the findings from such research rests on the rigor with
which systematic steps in the research process are
employed. Multiple levels of data analysis and taking steps to ensure validity contribute to the rigor
of the research, and the results of these studies are
typically written in the form of scientific reports
similar in structure to that used for the reporting of
quantitative studies.

Application

Grounded theory, a now widely used approach
to qualitative research, as traditionally constructed aligns most closely with positivistic and
post-positivistic assumptions (Bryant & Charmaz,
2010). It was first developed by Glaser and Strauss
(1967) in response to what they considered to be
an overemphasis on hypothesis testing and the
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verification of theory in sociological research. They
argued that the work of theory generation could
not be complete and that all human experience was
unlikely to be captured and accounted for by the
existing grand theories of the time. They put forth
grounded theory as a systematic approach to qualitative data collection and analysis to be carried out
with the explicit purpose of discovering new theory
from data or building new theory from the ground
up, rather than by logical deductions from a priori
assumptions. Although grounded theory turned the
process of scientific inquiry in the post-positivist
tradition on its head by beginning with the collection of data to use to ultimately build theory rather
than collecting data to prove or disprove existing
theory, the foundational assumptions on which traditional grounded theory rests are largely rooted in
post-positivism. That said, constructive approaches
to grounded theory have also been articulated and
widely implemented (e.g., Charmaz, 2006), and
others have argued that grounded theory techniques
can be implemented using a variety of philosophical
approaches (Birks & Mills, 2011).
Traditional grounded theory “accepts that there
is an external world that can be described, analyzed,
explained and predicted: truth, but with a small
t” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 524). Part of the intent of
grounded theory was to codify qualitative research
methods and put forth a systematic set of explicit
strategies for carrying out the research process, with
the assumption being that following a systematic set
of methods would lead to the discovery of real phenomena and the development of verifiable “theories” of them (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Such work,
however, requires getting out into the field to collect
rich data on which to build these theories. Some of
the defining features of a grounded theory approach
are (a) simultaneous data collection and analysis,
(b) the development of codes from the data rather
than from theory, (c) constant comparison of data
at all levels of the data collection and analytic process, (d) theoretical sampling to serve the purpose
of theory generation rather than representativeness
of the sample, and (e) memo writing to define and
elaborate on emerging categories and the relationships among them (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss
& Corbin, 1998).

Social Constructionism

The tenets of the discipline throughout the
twentieth century tended to place social constructionism at the opposite pole of experimental social
psychology (Jost & Kruglanski 2002), with the idea

being that work in social psychology should fall on
either end of the spectrum: you either do quantitative experiments or you engage in qualitative studies that are undergirded by a social constructionist
paradigm. Although the two extremes have begun
to meet in the middle in recent years, it is important
to examine the role that the social constructionist
perspective has played in shaping our thinking and
work in the field of psychological research.
The notion of social construction first gained
popularity in the United States after the publication
of Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) seminal book,
The Social Construction of Reality. Relying on the
work of Schutz, Berger and Luckmann argued that
all of our understandings and knowledge are socially
constructed. The idea is that we create our own reality through social interactions, relationships, and
experiences. From the ontological perspective, reality is context- and socially relative, and therefore
many realities can exist simultaneously (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966; Gergen, 1996). If our reality is
constructed, then, too, our knowledge and meanings are derived from social interactions. Individuals
hold them in their minds, but the epistemological
notion of reality and meanings are not individual
in nature but instead are constantly “negotiating
meaning” (Gergen, 1996).
This has significant implications for both how
we analyze the findings from past research in the
field as well as how we shape future research projects. As Gergen (1996) states, “research findings
don’t have any meaning until they are interpreted”
and interpretations “result from a process of negotiating meaning in the community (119).” The data
do not reveal anything in or of themselves; instead,
it is the way that psychologists utilize and interpret
the data that reveals meaning. But again, it is not a
truth that is revealed, or rather it is a truth, the truth
that the researcher, given his or her experiences and
knowledge, created while interacting with the social
environment. Diverse and influential work, such
as Milgram’s (1974) experiment and Burr’s (1998)
work on the social construction of gender, illustrates
the power of social interactions to frame and influence our understandings and realities.
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes,
social construction highlights the social creation of
identity. Identity creation and maintenance is work
that we are constantly engaged in as individuals; we
use Goffmanian (1955) performances and props
to test how others interpret our identities, which
then impacts how we think of our identity. This is
also true for the related notion of self-worth. In an
Spencer, Pryce, Walsh
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interesting study examining the social construction
of identity among the homeless in Austin, Texas,
Snow and Anderson (1987) found that there can
be both a social identity (the identity that society
gives you) and a personal identity (the identity you
hold in your mind). Traditionally, these would be
thought to align, but through a social construction approach Snow and Anderson (1987) argued
that there are cases in which people cannot easily
reconcile the public and personal. This has obvious
implications for the field of social psychology and
identity research.
Social construction, as defined by Berger and
Luckmann (1966), suggests that reality is constantly in flux as it is negotiated and renegotiated
through our experiences social worlds. From this
core idea, other branches of social construction,
such as symbolic interaction, phenomenology, and
ethnomethodology, have evolved. Because they all
fall under the social construction umbrella, it can
be difficult at times to determine their differences.
How does symbolic interactionism really differ
from phenomenology, for example? The following
sections lay out these three offshoots of social construction and attempt to present both their historical precedence as well as their current engagement
with the discipline.

Copyright © 2014. Oxford University Press, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Symbolic Interactionism

History
The symbolic interactionist approach was first
developed in the early 1900s by George Herbert
Mead (1913) at the University of Chicago. He was a
member of the eminent group of sociologists (loosely
termed at the time because he also taught philosophy) working as part of the Chicago School in the
early to mid-1900s. The Chicago School came to
be known in particular for the development of the
symbolic interactionist approach to studying daily
life. Mead argued that society and all its component
parts—structures, interactions, and meanings—are
developed through social interactions, thus macroanalyses can and should really be reduced to their
smaller microlevel interactions. The theory was
popular during the time of the Chicago School and
was then expanded and adapted by Herbert Blumer
in 1960s. Blumer did not like the emphasis placed
on macrolevel structures that dominated most of
the sociological research at the time and thought
that symbolic interactionism offered an alternative
theoretical framework. Blumer’s work (1969) was
resurrected as an empirical framework in the 1980s,
and its popularity has ebbed and flowed since. One
86

of the most renowned sociologists utilizing symbolic interactionism today is Sheldon Stryker at
Indiana University.
Foundational Assumptions
Although Mead did not refer to the theory as
such, symbolic interactionism is based on the
overarching premise that all aspects of society are
socially constituted. From macrolevel power structures to microlevel daily interactions, all are created through social interactions at various levels.
Embedded in this perspective is the notion that
meanings (about these power structures, interactions, etc.) are derived from social interactions. For
both Mead and Blumer, the unit of analysis is the
individual, not society or institutions. They were
both reacting against the notion that social structures (i.e., socioeconomic stats) explain outcomes.
Structures, according to symbolic interactionists,
are just groups of people repeatedly engaged in
interaction.
Our social interactions lead us to develop “shared
meanings” (Sandstrom, Martin, & Fine, 2006);
through our interactions with others, we take on
common definitions of emotions, experiences, and
ways of acting. Thus, for example, gender norms
may be taught, both consciously and unconsciously
from early childhood; in this way, a female understands what it “means” to be a woman in her society
without ever being explicitly told. A girl does not
learn this in a bubble; rather, it is through her social
interactions with others that she comes to understand what constitutes appropriate behavior, dress,
appearance, and the like. She learns this through her
experiences and the responses she gets from others.
Symbolic interactionism “stresses that people create, negotiate, and change social meanings through
the process of interaction” (Sandstrom et al., 2006,
p. 1). The key point here, for Blumer and others, is
that meanings are constantly evolving. So, to follow
the example just mentioned, our understanding of
gender is not a fixed fact (because it might be different in different regions, religions, and time periods)
but the result of previously experienced gendered
interactions in our past. We take our previous interactions with us and apply them to the next interaction. Interactions, even with people we have just
met, are not completely insulated events. Rather,
each person brings to the interaction all of his or
her previous interactions and meanings. Thus, a
man and a woman in conversation will bring to this
exchange all of their previously held ideas about
femininity and masculinity, which they will use as

Philosophical Approaches to Qualitative Research

<i>Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research : Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research</i>, edited by Patricia Leavy, Oxford University Press,
Incorporated, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unm/detail.action?docID=1657789.
Created from unm on 2019-09-12 06:24:21.

Copyright © 2014. Oxford University Press, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

a guide for navigating this new interaction. And of
ultimate importance is Goffman’s (1959) notion
of the feedback loop; you act based on your prior
understandings, receive feedback from your new
partner, and then take this new feedback with you
into your future interactions. As this process continues, you may alter your meanings, and potentially your behavior, over time. It is a process, not
a set plan.
Because behavior and meaning are social constituted, so, too, is the self. Most symbolic interactionists would argue that there is no core/true
individual identity. Rather, we engage in identity
work in which take on different identities to manage the diversity of our social interactions. So, for
example, in the classroom setting, one takes on the
role of either professor or student. Out of this context, we may take on an entirely different identity,
such as mother. None of these identities represents
our “true self,” but rather they are all appropriate
context-specific roles. We base these roles on what
Goffman (1959) called “the generalized other” or
the group/people we interact with. So, we base
our mothering role on our interactions with our
children, our experiences with our own parents,
friends, and media/cultural influences. As the “generalized other” changes, so do our identities. As a
result of the primacy of social interactions, Mead’s
original theory is a very fluid one. Meanings are
iterative because they are informed by our ongoing
interactions.
Implications for Research Methods
The legacy of symbolic interactionism for
research in psychology is an important one. First,
the notion that all behaviors, from internal thoughts
to outward interactions, are socially constituted
has an impact on the psychological discourse. For
researchers, this means that the participant cannot
be looked at simply as an individual but rather as
an individual in the social context. Thus, a person’s
thoughts and judgments are not solely the product of his or her own mind, but rather of his or
her understandings based on social interactions
(Sandstrom et al., 2006). And, additionally, one
of the byproducts of social interaction is feedback
about ourselves; we internalize others’ perceptions
of us, which can in turn influence our self-concept
(Cook & Douglas 1998). This has significant implications for any researchers studying mental health
because it means that the mind is no longer a solely
internal, individual unit of analysis. Our thoughts,
ideas, hopes, and fears are all rooted in the social

world and therefore have both social causes and
consequences. Therefore, the “social act” should be
the unit of analysis (Sandstrom et al., 2006).
Symbolic interactionists also highlight individual agency to form and change the world around us.
Individuals “designate meanings, define situations
and plan lines of action. In so doing, they actively
construct the reality of their environment and exercise a measure of control over it” (Sandstrom et al.,
2006, p. 6). We do this through the process of interacting, reflecting on, and evaluating interactions,
and acting. This process is dynamic and, at least to
some degree, controlled by the individual. There
is no right or set meaning or type of interaction.
Instead, we each create our own realities based on
our understandings and meanings. Thus, it is still
possible for two people to react to the same interaction very differently because each will bring his or
her own history of social interactions and meanings
to this experience.
Rooting the theory in individual meanings
and experiences has implications for the types of
research methods symbolic interactionists will
utilize. The most commonly utilized approaches
are ethnography, grounded theory, and narrative
analysis because these methods allow the themes
to emerge from the data, thereby preserving the
individual experiences and realities. These methods
more readily address the question of how people
make meaning out of experiences in their lives and
do not allow the researcher’s assumptions and own
set of meanings to dictate the findings that emerge
from the data.
Application
The border between social psychology and sociology is often blurred by researchers in both disciplines’ use of symbolic interactionism. In particular,
Stryker (1987) argued that the movement in psychology away from behaviorism and toward a value
placed on subjective experience is the result of the
use of symbolic interactionism as a lens through
which to examine psychological research. Thus, it
is fair to say that the scope of symbolic interactionism’s influence is far reaching within the field. One
interesting study that took a symbolic interactionist
approach is Ponticelli’s (1999) study of former lesbians who, due to religious involvement in an ministry that does not acknowledge homosexuality, must
reframe their sexual identities to align with their
newly acquired religious beliefs. Ponticelli’s research
method involved eight months of participant observations, interviews, and material analysis, and her
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goal was to understand the ways that the ex-lesbians
in her study construct a narrative of their sexuality. Symbolic interactionism lends itself well to this
kind of study because it brings participants’ own
understandings and narratives to the study rather
than the researcher’s personal assessment of the participants’ stories. Additionally, Ponticelli’s study also
incorporates a symbolic interactionist approach in
its attempt to focus on the ways that meaning is created and adjusted over time.
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Phenomenology

History
Phenomenology was first established by Edmund
Husserl in the early 1900s. It has subsequently been
used as an approach within psychology as well as
in other disciplines in the social sciences. Husserl’s
original goal was to find a way to conduct objective
scientific analysis of subjective topics, such as emotion. Phenomenology, along with the ideologically
similar symbolic interactionism, has been an important philosophical approach underpinning much of
psychological research. In particular, phenomenology has influenced the Duquesne School as well as
the experimental approaches utilized in psychological research. In spite of the influence of phenomenology within the field of psychology, over time, its
theoretical premise has been challenged by some of
the field’s giants: James, Skinner, and Watson have
at various times all challenged phenomenology and
advocated a more scientific approach to the discipline of psychology. The debate continues today,
and many researchers still question what constitutes
phenomenological research as well as its merits as a
philosophical framework.
Foundational Assumptions
Phenomenology is rooted in the notion that all
of our knowledge and understanding of the world
comes from our experiences (Hein & Austin,
2001). At their core, there are significant similarities
between phenomenology and symbolic interactionism in that both focus on the ways our engagement with society affects our worldviews. However,
whereas symbolic interactionism focuses on the
ways that social interactions affect our meaning,
phenomenology takes the broader aim of studying
experiences (phenomena). But, like symbolic interactionism, the focus is not on the events themselves,
but rather on the ways in which we experience
things and the meanings these experiences create
for us. As Kockelmans (1973) writes, it is “bringing to light the usually hidden meanings which
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motivate the concrete modes of man’s orientation
toward the world” (p. 274). As such, those who utilize the phenomenological approach seek to make
explicit the “taken-for-grantedness” 
assumptions
that guide our experiences (Hein & Austin, 2001,
p. 6). In essence, there is no objective reality, but
rather it is our experiences and our perceptions of
these experiences (i.e., our lived experiences) that
are our reality. Given that the meanings we create
from our experiences are largely based on the social
context (Smith, 2011), there is a clear link to symbolic interactionism.
Additionally, phenomenologists believe that
behavior is a reflection of our previous experiences;
we act in response to our temporal and spatial memories of past experiences or, as Keen (1975) writes,
“behavior is an expression of being in the world”
(p. 27). Thinking about behavior as a product of
our past experiences forces us to consider action and
individual agency as embedded in a broader social
context. Related to this question of behavior is the
notion of intentionality; namely, the idea that every
experience is in response to or connected to some past
experience. Thus, attempting to examine the experience as “in the moment” is, from a phenomenological perspective, missing the unique understandings
the individual brought to the current experience.
Implications for Research Methods
As a research method, phenomenology involves
studying how we make sense of our experiences or
“participant perspectives” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998,
p. 26). Therefore, as researchers, we cannot assume
that we know what meanings people make of certain events. For example, even though we may think
the standard response is to be sad after the death of
a parent, we cannot presume that a participant in
our study feels this or any other emotion. The job
of the researcher is to uncover what it is people take
for granted (i.e., what they might not even think
to tell us in an interview and what we might not
think to ask because we assume they think like we
do). To do this, the researcher must first come to
understand the assumptions and biases he or she
brings to the research. Underlying phenomenological research is the notion of bracketing assumptions, which is the idea that, before we can conduct
any analysis of our data, we must first explore our
own biases or the “taken-for-grantedness” (Hein &
Austin, 2001, p. 6) that make up our unique perspectives. Of course, there is no way we, as researchers, can operate outside of our assumptions and
experiences. However, the self-reflection for which
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phenomenologists advocate does at least charge the
researcher with keeping these biases in mind when
conducting analysis.
Approaching a research question with the
assumption that experience forms the basis for
behavior and understanding fundamentally lends
itself to certain research methods. In particular, utilizing methods that emphasize gathering data on
lived experience from the participant’s perspective
is essential. To that end, methods such as ethnomethodology, ethnography, and narrative analysis
are particularly relevant for researchers utilizing the
phenomenological approach because all of these
methods focus on uncovering the meanings individuals give to their experiences.
Application
A great deal of the research in psychotherapy is
rooted in the phenomenological approach because
many scholars in this field see as their goal “discovering psychological meanings by identifying
the essential psychological structure of an interviewee’s description of an experience” (Camic
et al., 2003, p. 8). A concrete example of this
comes from Carl Rogers’s client-centered therapy
(1951). Rogers found that many of his patients
struggled not with what actually happened—that
is, the “in the moment” reality—but with their
perceptions and feelings about what happened. As
a result, therapy must be targeted to address the
individual’s set of perceptions and understandings. To follow up with the example of a person
dealing with the death of a parent, a therapist cannot follow a preset protocol for helping the client because each patient’s experiences and feelings
about death will be different.
From the perspective of social psychology, the
phenomenological approach has implications
for how we conduct and think about research on
identity. In its most general sense, phenomenology de-emphasizes the self as a unique individual,
which has implications for the types of research
questions we ask, as well as for the methods we utilize. A phenomenological study of identity allows
for open-ended questions that allow participants to
present, through the construction of a narrative for
example, what identity means to them and how it
functions in their lives. This is especially relevant for
factors such as gender, race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, which, depending on our context, can constrain or enhance our experiences and
interactions. One example of this type of work is
Friedman, Friedlander, and Blustein’s (2005) study

that used a phenomenological approach to develop
an understanding of how Jews construct their collective religious and ethnic identity as a highly
assimilated but still distinct population within the
United States.
A well-defined method with some roots in phenomenology (among other approaches) is consensual qualitative research (CQR; Hill, Knox,
Thompson, Williams, Hess, & Ladany, 2005; Hill,
Thompson, & Williams, 1997). It is a method for
interview research that has been used in numerous
studies in psychology, especially within counseling
psychology. Consensual qualitative research is actually constructivist in ontology, in that it assumes
multiple realities, and in epistemology because the
researcher experience matters and informs interview question development. However, it also has
post-positivistic leanings, with its emphasis on consensus among a team of researchers in the construction of findings, close adherence to a systematic
approach, and interest in generalization and (Hill
et al., 2005).
In CQR, consistent data are collected across
participants through semistructured interviews and
then analyzed by multiple “judges” who must come
to a consensus about the meaning of the data. At
least one “auditor” also checks the “primary team
of judges” to work against the potential for groupthink. Data analysis is carried out in three steps.
First, participant responses to the open-ended interview questions are divided into domains or topic
areas. Then, core ideas, which are abstracts or brief
“summaries of the data that capture the essence of
what was said in fewer words and with greater clarity” are constructed within each domain for each
individual case (Hill et al., 2005, p. 200). Finally,
cross-case analysis is carried out by developing categories that describe the common themes reflected
in the core ideas within domains across cases.
Consensus is at the core of the CQR method,
with the assumption being that consideration
of multiple perspectives brings us closer in our
approximation of the “truth” and reduces the
influence of researcher bias (Hill, Thompson, &
Williams, 1997). Using teams of three to five analysts, coders first look at the data independently
and then come together to discuss their ideas
until consensus about the single best representation of the data is reached. The goal here is not
what is typically thought of as interrater reliability, wherein preagreement about how to code
data is established and then carried out with the
goal of achieving the highest levels of accuracy in
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agreement in coding. Rather, it is expected, and
even hoped, that team members will begin with
different ideas about the data so that the final
product reflects and integrates multiple perspectives and is less fraught with individual bias. The
potential for groupthink is minimized through the
use of one or two additional team members who
serve as auditors to review and check the primary
team’s interpretations and judgments. The auditors review the work of the primary team once the
core ideas for each domain have been established
consensually and then again when the cross-case
categories have been determined. At each of these
stages, the auditors review the raw material and
provide comments back to the primary team who
must then carefully consider each comment and
determine through discussion whether to accept
or reject each one.

Critical Theory

Copyright © 2014. Oxford University Press, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Critical theory as an approach represents a key
postmodern paradigm and offers alternatives to
the postmodernist and constructivist lenses. In
the context of research, the application of critical
theory emphasizes the ways by which the values of
the researcher and those studied impact the social
world. This point of view contributes to a larger
shift in research over the past several decades (Kidd
& Kral, 2005), one that privileges meaning and
requires a rethinking of knowledge (Goodman &
Fisher, 1995).

History

Critical theory has had many distinct historical
phases that cross several generations. The birth of this
paradigm is considered to have taken place through
the Institute for Social Research at the University
of Frankfurt am Main during 1929–1930. During
this time, the arrival of the “Frankfurt School”
philosophers and social theorists (Creswell, 2007),
including Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and
Herbert Marcuse, marked an idealistic, utopian
vision that stretched beyond the more customary
“positivist” tradition of the time. This emergence
offered criticism to the status, structure, and goal of
the traditional social sciences (Adorno et al., 1969).
The German philosophers and social theorists of
the Frankfurt School were influenced by the barbarism of World War I and what was perceived as the
inhumanity of post-war capitalism so widespread in
Europe at the time. During World War II, several
key contributors to the School moved to the United
States in an effort to escape the war. Once in the
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United States, these thinkers were struck by the gulf
between the stated progressive agenda within the
United States and the very real differences between
races and social classes present, in large part due to
discrimination (Ponterotto, 2005).
According to these theorists, “critical” theory
may be distinguished from “traditional” theories to
the extent that it seeks human emancipation and a
disruption of the status quo. Ontologically, critical
theory challenges the idea that reality is natural and
objective because reality is shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender-based
forces into social structures. Instead, critical theorists assume that reality can only come to be known
through a subjective frame and as shaped by values
and mediated by power relations that are socially
and historically constituted.
More recently, Jurgen Habermas’s (1988; 1990)
work on communicative reason and linguistic intersubjectivity has represented iconic work in critical
theory in the more modern era. Habermas’s work
has enabled strategies of community building and
social movements based on his work in communication. This work has not taken place without scrutiny, however. Theorists such as Nikolas Kompridis
have opposed some of Habermas’s ideas (Kompridis,
2006), claiming that these recent approaches have
undermined the original aims of social change
espoused by critical theory, particularly in terms of
the critique of modern capitalism.

Foundational Assumptions

According to Horkheimer, a critical theory is
adequate only if it is explanatory, practical, and
normative (1972). In other words, it has to address
what is wrong with current social reality, identify
the actors to change it, provide clear norms for criticism, and identify practical goals for social transformation. The orientation of this theory is toward
transformation, traditionally of capitalism into a
“real democracy”.
Foundation ideals are based on a fundamental
struggle for equality and social justice. Knowledge
is used to emancipate the oppressed, and “validity
is found when research creates action” (Lincoln,
Lynham, & Guba, 2011, p. 114). Given this definition, a number of “critical theories” have been
developed to demonstrate differences in power in
the areas of gender, race and ethnicity, class, sexual
orientation, and disabilities, many of which have
emerged in connection with the social movements
associated with these areas, particularly in the
United States. In short, a critical theory provides the
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basis and groundwork for research aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom.
Critical theory by and large rejects the assumption that a scientific or objective basis of criticism
needs to be grounded in a grand theory. Rather,
epistemologically, critical theory privileges agents’
own knowledge and understandings, with an
assumption that these understandings can be a basis
for social criticism in themselves. In other words,
theories can have “a relative legitimacy” (Habermas,
1988, p. 3). Habermas also argues that, relative to
other existing theories, the role of critical theory is
to unify these multiple theories, considering their
varied methods and presuppositions (Habermas,
1988). Given this role, it stands to reason that any
social scientific method or explanation-producing
theory can be potentially critical.
Similarly, in critical theory, the relationship
between researcher and participant is transactional,
subjective, and dialectic. In other words, what can
be known is inextricably tied to the interaction
between an investigator and an object or group.
Insofar as one can separate oneself from marginalized groups in an effort to remain “objective,” one
removes oneself from one’s “share” of the social
condition studied, likely perpetuating the inequalities that contribute to the adverse social conditions
often of interest to social scientists.
Researchers who employ critical theory take
values a step further than constructivists do in that
they hope and expect their value biases to influence
the research process and outcome. More specifically,
because critical theory concerns itself with unequal
distributions of power and the resultant oppression
of subjugated groups, a preset goal of the research is
to empower participants to transform the status quo
and emancipate themselves from ongoing oppression. Thus, critical theorist researchers acknowledge
at the outset that they expect results to document
the high levels of stress or disadvantage of the group
under study. Beyond this, such researchers aim to
use the results and report of the study in some way to
advocate for improvement of the examined group.

Implications for Research Methods

Critical theorists, given their stance on the
importance of researcher–participant interaction and the significance of understanding values
as influencing the reality under study, more often
use naturalistic designs in which the researcher is
engaged in the daily life of participants. Critical
theoretical approaches tend to rely on dialogic
methods, which may combine data collection

methods (e.g., participant observation, in-depth
interviewing, first-person written reports) with
opportunity for reflection. This approach intentionally invites a questioning of the “natural” status
quo and order and an exploration of the tensions
that characterize the social issue under exploration.
Inherently challenging, this approach values transparency and welcomes opportunities for alternative
paradigms to be considered as part of the learning
process itself.
Methodologically, contexts are not merely conceptualized as “variables,” but as essential parts of
subjectivity according to critical theory. In terms
of the field of psychology, this approach invites
us to consider the role of research in terms of how
liberation might take shape across the lifespan.
Qualitative approaches in which a researcher’s social
justice values help direct inquiry, such as PAR (Kidd
& Kral, 2005), provide ample example of critical
theory at work in the research context.

Application in the Field

Participatory action research is a form of action
research anchored in the belief that the research process itself serves as a mechanism for social change.
Participatory action research is an approach focused
on critical theory because, at its core, PAR is geared
toward empowerment of participants that leads to
emancipation from oppression and enhanced quality of life. In laypersons’ terms, “you get people
affected by a problem together, figure out what is
going on as a group, and then do something about
it” (Kidd & Kral, 2005, p. 187).
According to Kemmis and McTaggart (2005),
PAR often involves a cycle of self-reflection and
action in addressing a community problem.
Participants and researchers establish a collaborative
relationship as they ask critical questions about the
current life situation. This dialogue moves the group
to action as they develop knowledge and further
explore the problem and how it can be addressed.
In this way, collaborators using PAR begin to set a
stage of social action to instigate change.
The process of change emerges and shifts as part
of the self-reflective cycles, but typically is not predetermined by a clear series of procedural and analytic steps. Instead, during the reflective and action
spiral, PAR investigators rely on a wide variety of
methods and procedures as they gradually better
understand the needs of the community. As such,
many studies that use PAR take on varied methods
such as storytelling, sharing experiences, individual
and focus group interviews, participant observation,
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drawings, and even the more structured qualitative
interview or quantitative survey as the need merits.
When engaged in a PAR process, study participants are expected to participate fully. However,
the creation of such participatory contexts is very
challenging and time-consuming, and is not the
norm (Kidd & Kral, 2005). Disempowered groups
are seldom given the opportunity and at times are
discouraged from this type of action. Further compounding this problem is the tendency for established forums (e.g., academia) to claim exclusive
ownership of methods of knowledge gathering and
avenues for change. All of these challenges further
lend the process of PAR to be informed by critical theory. As a specific example, Dentith, Measor,
and O’Malley (2012) outline the practice of using
critical theory across three separate research projects
involving young people facing various life difficulties and vulnerabilities. In so doing, they highlight
the dilemmas they face in doing so within the context of more traditional, positivist approaches frequently favored in academic research settings.
Participatory action research is somewhat new to
the field of psychology and has not historically been
utilized frequently in this field. This is likely at least
in part due to the axiology of PAR as a critical theory
method that advocates a value-directed (rather than
value-neutral post-positivism or value-bracketed
constructivism) stance. Traditionally trained psychologists may be made initially uncomfortable by
research that is value mediated because psychological training often conceives of research as objective,
in which participants are studied without changing
them or the researchers.

Feminist Theories

Feminist theories are used to frame and understand research approaches across a range of disciplines and social problems. They developed in
part in response to prevailing ideas that more
traditional scientific inquiry tended to exclude
women from inquiry and deny women epistemic
authority (Anderson, 1995). They are often associated with critical theory, although they have
been considered by some to be separate (Crotty,
1998), yet closely related, within the epistemological continuum.

History

Informed by the political ideologies of the 1970s
women’s movement, feminist scholars sought to
reinterpret and modify concepts within the philosophy of science to create feminist approaches to
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research. Originally fueled by activism, feminism as
an academic focus has developed significantly from
the 1980s until the present. According to feminist
paradigms, the traditional philosophy of science has
tended to produce theories that represent women
(or their activities and interests) as inferior to their
male counterparts. Further, “feminine” cognitive
styles and modes of knowledge have been denigrated
by traditional inquiry (Anderson, 1995), producing
knowledge that is not relevant to people in subordinate positions and/or that reinforces unequal power
dynamics, particularly as it relates to gender.

Foundational Assumptions

Feminist theories “place gender at the center of
inquiry,” and yet “increasingly incorporate multiple. . . intersectionalities of identity,” including
sexuality, race, religion, and social class (Marshall &
Rossman, 2010, p. 27). Similar to critical theory,
the larger aim of feminist theories is to turn thought
into action (Marshall & Rossman, 2010), in this
case by focusing on the issues faced by women and
other often marginalized groups.
Epistemologically, feminist theories focus on the
accounts of women (and other historically marginalized groups) as legitimate and core sources of knowledge. Of note, feminist theories are not distinguished
so much by their substantive topic (e.g., women’s
issues, gender, reproductive rights, etc.) or by the gender of the researcher (i.e., male or female) but rather
by their orientation and guiding philosophy on epistemology and research creation (e.g., methodology).

Implications for Research Methods

Over the past two decades, feminist scholars
have developed alternative epistemologies to guide
the process of doing research. Feminist methodologies attempt to eradicate sexist bias in research
while capturing women’s voices, particularly those
consistent with feminist ideals. Epistemologically,
feminist theories privilege women’s experiences
as not only legitimate, but also as important and
revealing bases of knowledge. Work guided by
feminist theories often aims to employ qualitative methodologies toward the exploration of
power imbalances, starting with that between the
researcher and researched (Marshall & Rossman,
2010), so as to engender trust and collect accurate
data. Research informed by feminist theory, like
critical theory more broadly, also challenges academia traditionally due to its value of application
of research to lived experiences (Smart, 2009),
particularly among those who are oppressed.
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Thus, feminist theories mirror the core values of
critical theory in emphasizing the mutual learning between the researcher and the researched, an
exchange that is critical to the emancipation of
disenfranchised or overlooked groups.
Feminist research has emphasized the importance of exploring the day-to-day experiences
of marginalized groups, particularly women.
Qualitative approaches are particularly well-suited
to capturing the “messiness” of these daily experiences because these methods can account for emotions, as well as for other less tangible aspects of
experience, in data collection. Often, feminist
theories invite more traditional forms of qualitative
data collection (e.g., interviewing, focus groups,
ethnography) to be adapted to be more consistent
with feminist ideology.
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Application

As referenced earlier, a feminist approach to
research can be employed across the social as well
as physical sciences and beyond. For the most part,
researchers employing this approach attempt to
eradicate sexist bias in research while seeking to capture women’s voices, particularly as they apply to the
day-to-day experiences of everyday life. This angle
lends itself well to studies such as those examining
the experiences of domestic workers and domestic
violence. Core to the use of feminist theory is the
understanding that ways of knowing, or epistemologies, are constantly evolving as knowledge grows
and as the “knowers” expand in scope. Thus, bodies
of research, as they make use of a feminist lens, may
find that the social problem under study increases
the complexity of the problem under study. This is
characteristic of feminist methodologies. However,
such an approach is also characterized by reducing
the hierarchical relationship between researchers
and their participants to facilitate trust and disclosure and recognizing and reflecting on the emotionality of women’s lives.

Queer Theory
History

With the rise of the gay liberation movement in
the post-Stonewall era, gay and lesbian perspectives
began to contribute to politics, philosophy, and
social theory. Initially, these were often connected
to feminist ideology. However, in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, queer theory was developed as its own
framework. The term “queer,” as opposed to “gay
and lesbian,” also distinguished the theory from
those that preceded it, specifically gay liberation

theories. Similar to feminist theories, queer theory
was accompanied by social movements, and its
emergence evolved in part as a reaction to the marginalization of the LBGTQ community and the
ways by which “science” had historically been used
against them (Minton, 1997).
Queer theory found a more natural home in
qualitative research because this form had historically been less focused on objective reality and more
on subjective experiences (Downing & Gillett,
2011). However, its emergence has occurred within
an ongoing evolution in terms of how we consider
sexuality and marginalization in research and in
society at large. In the early 1900s, the scientific
examination of those who were in same-sex relationships was perpetually challenged by the stigma
and silence faced by this group. In short, this population was hard to identify and find, much less
research. The second half of the twentieth century,
however, shifted this as lesbian and gay studies
expanded exponentially (Gamson, 2000), focusing
explicitly on the lives of those who identify as gay
or lesbian. Queer theory, a more recent arrival on
the scene, has introduced a post-structuralist critique by suggesting that the self cannot and should
not be identified by sexuality or sexual orientation by itself, thereby challenging the importance
of studying sexuality as a “subject” of inquiry.
Although the tension proposed by these shifts is
often applauded within the qualitative research
world (e.g., Gamson, 2000), it is this context in
which queer theory has emerged.

Foundational Assumptions

Queer theory was separate from gay liberation
theories in several ways. First, queer theory defined
itself as not specific only to sexuality. Instead, queer
theory does not refer to a nature, be it sexual or otherwise, but rather as a relational construct. “Queer”
refers specifically to being “outside the norm”; this
norm can vary relative to context. In other words,
“Queer is. . . whatever is at odds with the normal, the
legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers. It is an identity
without an essence” (Halperin, 1995, p. 62; emphasis in the original).
Because queer theory does not suggest a specific
nature or essence, it therefore is inclusive of those
who may express themselves outside any norm,
including that of the gay and lesbian community. In
other words, sadomasochism, perhaps marginalized
by some constructs, is not so according to queer
theory. Additionally, this lack of focus on a specific
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essence allows gays and lesbians to identify by their
sexuality or by any other aspect of their identity,
thereby placing the focus on personal meaning, as
opposed to societally ascribed labels.

Implications for Research Methods

A central claim of queer theorists, which is
that identity is understood exclusively as a social
construct (rather than given by nature), significantly affects how research is carried out within
this approach. Most immediately, it implies that
research needs to be evaluated for biases that privilege heterosexuality (Butler, 1990; 1993), however
subtle. Based on the concern that queer theory
places on false dichotomies (e.g., “closeted” and
“out,” etc.), this theory also is critical of other
dichotomies implied in research, particularly as it
relates to assumptions regarding what is natural or
artificial and what is masculine versus feminine.
Instead, queer theory emphasizes the importance of
understanding categories more fluidly, an approach
that lends itself more toward qualitative methods,
which seek to explore social phenomena with an eye
toward complexity rather than standardization.
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Application

Queer theory has been applied to multiple social
problems and developmental issues. However,
it is most often applied to questions concerning
empowerment, resistance to domination (e.g., heterosexism, homophobia), gender identity and marginalization due to gender, sexual orientation, or
sexual behavior. Because queer theory is concerned
with the nonessential nature of sexual identity, this
theory pushes the field to consider identity from
multiple perspectives, and invites cultural as well as
race-related inquiry.

Conclusion and Future Directions

It is impossible to fully represent the richness
of any one of these philosophical approaches in a
chapter such as this one. We have instead tried to
convey a sense of the breadth of the field and to
illuminate at least some of the meaningful distinctions in the major approaches to qualitative research
in psychology today. In this last section, we turn our
attention to the future and identify three overarching, interrelated, and contested issues with which
the field is being confronted and will be compelled
to address as we move forward: retaining the rich
diversity that has defined the field, the articulation
of recognizable standards for qualitative research,
and the commensurability of differing approaches.
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The contested nature of these issues stems in part
from the very diversity of philosophical approaches
that has defined the field. Here, again, we cannot
possibly represent the considerable thought behind
and debate around each of these matters. Rather, we
simply raise and mark them at this time.
The diversity of approaches represented in the field
of qualitative research today speaks to the strength
of the movement and bodes well for our efforts to
both advance and deepen our understanding of the
psychological world. As Ann Hartman (1990) wrote
many years ago, “each way of knowing deepens our
understanding and adds another dimension to our
view of the world” (p. 3). Just as no single research
design or data collection method can adequately
capture the multidimensional nature of human psychology, no one philosophical approach can suitably
guide our efforts to address the full range of questions
that need to be pursued to develop the knowledge
needed “to benefit society and improve people’s lives”
(American Psychological Association, 2013).
However, this diversity in approaches to qualitative research also creates significant tensions and
makes attempts to “define” the field quite challenging. Despite the substantial work done by many
scholars (c.f. Denzin & Lincoln, 2013) to delineate
these contrasting perspectives and approaches, a
lack of awareness remains, especially (but not exclusively) among those not well-versed in qualitative
methods. The predictable misunderstandings and
strong differences in beliefs about what is “credible”
research that can result continue to plague those of
us who practice qualitative research as we strive to
get our work funded and published more widely.
Peer reviews of our work can often be riddled with
contradictory assessments of its rigor and even of
its basic value or contribution. (c.f. Ceglowski,
Bacigalupa, & Peck, 2011).
Continued efforts to make clear the diversity of
approaches, the philosophical assumptions guiding
these, and the particular contributions the differing
approaches make to our understanding of psychology are critical. We must be cautious about making
general claims about rigor and the “right” way to do
qualitative research that are actually framed within
our own narrower terms or experience with certain
approaches. Keeping the richness of the field alive
will require discipline on all of our parts to respond
to questions about how best to go about engaging
in high quality qualitative research or evaluating the
quality of the work of others by first acknowledging
“it depends” and then inquiring about the philosophical approach, aims, and context of the work.
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One of the biggest challenges before us is the
continued articulation of recognizable standards for
qualitative research that represent, and which ideally
can be applied to, the full range of approaches. The
very differences in purpose and aims and in philosophical approaches that comprise the rich field of
qualitative research today makes such efforts seem
impossible. However, ignoring this task in the era
of what has been called the scientifically based
research movement (National Research Council,
2002; Torrance, 2008), defined largely in terms of
experimental design and methods and with randomized controlled trials heralded as the “gold standard,”
leaves the array of approaches that do not readily fit
this mold highly vulnerable. But what is the best way
to address these complex and high-stakes issues?
Researchers taking a more post-positivistic
approach have argued that there are separate but
parallel sets of standards for validity and reliability in qualitative and quantitative research (e.g.,
Hammersley, 1992; Kuzel & Engel, 2001). Some
constructivists have put forth that a common set
of standards can be established but because the
foundational philosophical approaches between
post-positivism and constructivism are so different, a separate and distinct set of criteria need to be
applied. Models using concepts such as trustworthiness, transferability, and authenticity have been
developed (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1989), and it
is estimated that more than 100 quality appraisal
forms have been put forth (Saini & Shlonsky,
2012). Unfortunately, most do not make clear the
philosophical assumptions that undergird them
(Saini & Shlonsky, 2012), which unfortunately further muddies the water. Moreover, other adherents
to constructivist approaches hold that the contextual and relational nature of knowledge construction precludes the possibility of establishing such
standards (e.g., Lincoln, 1995; Schwandt, 1996).
Finally, many working from within critical theory
and related approaches suggest that such standards
are inevitably formed by the power structures in
which they are housed, thereby potentially further
perpetuating the inequalities the research aims
to address or study (e.g., Garrett & Hodkinson,
1998). Furthermore, they assert that the quality of
the research should be based on an assessment of
whether it empowered participants to effect meaningful and lasting changes (Correa, 2013).
Some have tried to resolve these tensions by
suggesting guidelines they believe account for and
are applicable across the diversity of approaches
to qualitative research (e.g., Drisko, 1997; Saini

& Shlonsky, 2012; Tracy, 2010). These guidelines
focus on the different components of the research
process, such as clear identification of philosophical approach and aims of the research, specification
of methods and congruence between these and the
stated philosophical approach and aims, and transparency and clarity in sampling, data collection,
and data analytic procedures. Although the imperative to tackle these issues is clear, the way forward to
doing this is less so. Should we push further toward
agreeing on a shared set of standards that can be
applied across traditions, or invest in more localized
ones tailored specifically to particular approaches
(e.g., narrative analysis) and developed by scholars practicing these (Preissle, 2013), or both? How
might the myriad elements of research, including
the many gatekeeping activities in the research and
scholarship enterprise from funding through publication of research findings, address and accommodate these standards in their expectations and
processes? What is clear is that the diversity of
approaches to qualitative research must be fully represented in any efforts to further define and move
the field forward on this front.
Embracing and fully representing the diversity
of approaches and coming to terms with standards
for them stills leaves unaddressed a third concern
for the field moving forward, namely what has been
referred to as the commensurability of approaches.
That is, whether approaches rooted in the differing philosophical approaches can be “retrofitted to
each other in ways that make the simultaneously
practice of both possible” (Lincoln et al., 2013,
p. 238). Some, such as critical and feminist theorists, have argued that epistemological differences
between methods can render research paradigms
incompatible (Lincoln et al., 2013). Others have
dismissed assertions about irreconcilable differences
between philosophical approaches and research paradigms and argue for what they call a “pragmatic”
approach, particularly in the service of carrying
out mixed-methods research (e.g., Creswell, 2009;
Creswell & Clark, 2007; Maxcy, 2003). Lincoln,
Lynham, and Guba (2013) take a middle position
and offer a “cautious” endorsement of the commensurability of approaches. They assert that some
approaches share some elements that are similar or
strongly related and therefore can be effectively and
meaningfully combined, whereas others are more
“contradictory and mutually exclusive” (p. 239).
Preissle (2013), in her consideration of the future of
the field, makes a pragmatic argument of a different
sort for commensurability. Citing the work of her
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students that has combined approaches in unconventional yet highly productive ways, she observes
that the novice scholars of today are “challenging,
even transgressing, epistemological and theoretical
boundaries” that will ultimately move research forward in unexpected ways” (p. 536).
There is nothing new about these questions.
They have been debated for decades now, and clarity seems no nearer. What has changed is the climate. It is at once more open to qualitative methods
than ever before and less accommodating of the
rich diversity among the approaches taken to this
work. Increasing numbers of graduate students are
being trained in multiple methodologies. Although,
unfortunately, there does not yet appear to be a cry
for purely qualitative studies on the horizon, most
major funding sources are at least indicating a preference for the use of multiple methods, in some cases
even quite strongly so. Qualitative studies can be
found in journals of differing ilk, not just within the
confines of those dedicated to publishing qualitative research. However, what is deemed acceptable
or “credible” qualitative research is narrowing. In
the parlance of the old expression “a little knowledge is a dangerous thing,” the widening exposure
and reach of qualitative work means that many more
scholars are encountering and engaging with it in
some way; these scholars often do not realize that
what they know is but a small slice of a now large
and longstanding field. Researchers outside the field
of qualitative research who participate in setting the
standards for research more broadly may be friendly
to particular kinds of approaches, such as seeing a
place for qualitative work only in the exploration of
new areas of inquiry to offer “thick description” and
examples or to complement or round out the quantitative findings, but much less so to stand-alone work
or work aimed at explicating processes and mechanisms at work in human psychology. Scholars from
within who are joining in the work of setting the
standards of research can sometimes allow certain
kinds of qualitative research to stand for the field,
which can serve to belie and even shut out other,
often more transgressive forms. These perhaps seemingly old and familiar questions about philosophies
of science, rigor, and commensurability are alive and
well, taking new forms, and they are, in some ways,
more important now than ever before.
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